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FOR PATIENTS AND PROFITS: ETHICAL
ASTUTENESS AND THE BUSINESS OF
DIALYSIS
JOSHUA E. PERRY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The business of health care is a unique enterprise wherein a
combination of goods and services necessary to preserve or improve the
health of another person are bought and sold.1 Whether in the physician’s
office or in the clinical examination room or at the hospital bedside, the
transfer of care from one person to another creates a unique relational
dynamic at the center of this business transaction. Often this engagement
between physician and patient is infused with deep trust, intimacy, and
vulnerability, as the encounter is frequently marked by fear, discomfort, and
uncertainty regarding the potential life and death consequences of decisions
made and actions taken.2

* Assistant Professor of Business Law & Ethics and Research Coordinator for the
Center for the Business of Life Sciences, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
(Bloomington). I am grateful to the editors of the Belmont Law Review for the invitation to
present a draft of this paper at their Fall 2014 Symposium and to the attendees, most notably
Randy Spivey, Debbie Farringer, and John Blum, for constructive feedback offered during
my presentation.
1. See generally Richard Smith et al., A Shared Statement of Ethical Principles for
Those Who Shape and Give Health Care: A Working Draft from the Tavistock Group, 130
ANN. INTERN. MED. 143, 145 (1999) (“Caring for sick people is a social obligation that
extends beyond the commercial realm. Although ownership of health care delivery
institutions or other organizations that deliver medical care may be appropriate, care itself
cannot be owned and must be viewed as a service that is rendered and remunerated under the
stewardship of those in the health care system rather than merely sold to individuals or
communities.”).
2. For example, worried and bewildered parents often find themselves face-to-face
with emergency room physicians and pediatricians. Beyond the dramas of parenthood,
thousands of adult children every day must confront a different set of gut-wrenching
dynamics as elderly parents waver between life and death. As one’s mom or dad, beloved
friend, or life partner is in the process of dying, those who sit vigil at the bedside are in no
mental or emotional condition to haggle over the price of palliative medications or secondguess the necessity of additional MRIs and CT scans. Or consider the young woman or man,
with a history of being sexually abused by authoritarian and trusted figures, sitting naked in
an examination room, being asked intimate questions about his or her body, diet, and
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These variables differentiate the business of delivering clinical
healthcare services from other industries in several fundamental ways.3
lifestyle. It takes an enormous amount of courage and trust for someone to be that
vulnerable. Yet, these are the dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship.
Each of these scenarios helps to reveal a little of what makes encounters with the
health care system unique in one’s daily interaction with other actors and institutions in the
marketplace. One’s interaction with one’s physician is simply categorically different than
one’s interaction with the gal selling hamburgers or the guy handling overnight package
delivery. The dynamics between a physician and her patient involve emotions and
vulnerabilities that make it impossible for patients to be the rational and savvy consumers
they might otherwise be in every other marketplace transaction. From the time of Ancient
Greece until now, purveyors of the healing arts have recognized this gross disparity in
“bargaining power” between one who needs care and who has the ability to provide care,
and in response a rich and robust ethical tradition has evolved. In Physician-Owned
Specialty Hospitals and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Health Care
Reform at the Intersection of Law and Ethics, I argued that these ethical dynamics must be
considered in the context of healthcare business. 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 369 (2012).
3. See Marc J. Roberts & Michael R. Reich, Ethical Analysis in Public Health, 359
THE LANCET 1055, 1057 (2002) (“[H]ealth is generally viewed as special or different from
most other things produced by the economy.”). See generally Norman Daniels, Justice,
Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2 (2001); Norman Daniels, JUST HEALTH CARE
(1985) (arguing that healthcare is “special” because of its impact on individual access to
opportunity in a free society). In his 2001 essay in American Journal of Bioethics, Daniels,
continuing to build upon Rawls’s theory of justice as fair equality of opportunity, succinctly
states that “by keeping people close to normal functioning, healthcare preserves for people
the ability to participate in the political, social, and economic life of their society. It sustains
them as fully participating citizens—normal collaborators and competitors—in all spheres of
social life.” Daniels, supra. But see Andrew C. Wicks & Adrian A.C. Keevil, When Worlds
Collide: Medicine, Business, the Affordable Care Act and the Future of Health Care in the
US, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 420 (2014). Wicks and Keevil offer a nuanced argument that
notes the unique aspects of health care, while concluding that “if we take a larger view of
business and health care, and see a broader array of stakeholder interests as legitimate and
important, then it becomes possible to see the objectives of ‘medicine’ and those tied to
‘business’ as less inherently in conflict—and requiring one system to dominate the other –
and to see how they may well be complementary.” Id. at 423. They continue:
This is not an invitation to suggestions that if we just turn medicine into a
marketplace then all of our problems are solved. Medicine is a special context
and health care is not a “commodity,” particularly in the sense we use to talk
about many of the discretionary goods that are bought and sold in traditional
markets. Many would argue that access to health care is not a discretionary
good (e.g., like ketchup or toothpaste). Rather, health care is a basic right that
all persons have, particularly because of its fundamental importance to having
other basic rights (citations omitted). At the same time there are powerful
informational and power asymmetries that make choices about health care far
more challenging than in other contexts. Both because of the complexity of
the “product” and their lack of technical knowledge, patients frequently have
difficulty fully grasping the background information relevant to
understanding their condition and the options available to them for treatment.
Their dependence on care providers to offer both diagnosis and treatment
compounds the difficulty and underscores the need to create a system where
patients are not misled or taken advantage of. Noting these challenges is not
intended to suggest that the market for health care is completely different
from other markets for goods and services, or that patients are fundamentally
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First, physicians and nurses are professionals that have historically enjoyed
a measure of public respect and deference concomitant with an expectation
that their medical judgments would be guided first and foremost by what
was in a particular patient’s best interest.4 This dynamic immediately
complicates the common understanding of a business venture’s first and
foremost priority, namely, to produce profits on behalf of shareholders or
investors.5
In the healthcare business, however, a patient, regardless of her
socioeconomic status or level of education, ultimately must trust her
healthcare professionals with her wellbeing.6 Even as sophisticated
healthcare consumers seek multiple opinions and consult virtual libraries of
data on the Internet, the motivation to self-educate and question is not
driven by a “buyer beware” precaution regarding what alternative
motivations – either to shareholder investors or to one’s personal ownership
interests – might be lurking in the shadows and influencing their doctor’s
medical judgment. Rather, patients seek second opinions or second-guess
their physicians because the practice of medicine is understood to be as
much art as it is science.7 Sophisticated healthcare consumers appreciate
the role that judgment plays in the decisions regarding appropriate medical
unable to advocate for themselves and make good choices. It is simply to note
some of the distinctive conditions of health care and the need to design a
system in which patients are put in positions where they can make informed
and sound choices.
Id. at 426.
4. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform,
19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 48 (1993) (“Indeed, traditional medical ethics insisted that
physicians do everything possible for the individual patient, independent of political or
economic constraints.”). See generally Joshua E. Perry, The Ethical Costs of
Commercializing the Professions: First-Person Narratives From the Legal and Medical
Trenches, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 169 (2010) (discussing the service component and
relational aspects at the heart of historic notions of professionalism).
5. Perhaps the most enduring statement regarding the appropriate mission of a
business is Milton Friedman’s classic, The Social Responsibility of Business to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 211 (“In either case, the key point is that, in his
capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the
corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to
them.”). Contra LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 25 (2012) (“The
notion that corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to maximize
shareholder wealth simply isn’t true.”); Gilmartin and Freeman infra note 9.
6. See Andrew C. Wicks, Albert Schweitzer or Ivan Boesky? Why We Should Reject
the Dichotomy Between Medicine and Business, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 341–42 (1995)
(“Due to the nature of the physician-patient relationship under a fee-for-service arrangement,
it is in the self-interest of the physician not only to apply beneficial therapies, but to be
overzealous. Providing aggressive and even excessive care to patients actually benefits the
physician financially.”).
7. Ann MacLean Massie, In Defense of the Professional Standard of Care: A
Response to Carter Williams on “Evidence-Based Medicine”, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535,
550 (2004) (citing Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of
Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2888 (1991)).
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interventions.8 To be clear, however, unlike customers shopping on a used
car lot or in a fashion boutique where the sales clerk works on commission,
healthcare consumers are not expected to take into account what Albert
Carr infamously referred to as the acceptable rules of puffery, deception,
and self-interest that many understand to be operative in the game of
business.9
Moreover, consider the “products” of the healthcare delivery
business. These too are unique in the marketplace of goods and services.
Maintaining good health, preventing the spread of disease, healing sickness,
treating chronic and non-curable afflictions, surgical interventions, and
improving life’s quality for those dying—these constitute the most popular
and top-selling widgets in the doctoring business.10 All of these outcomes
can be addressed by costly interventions, but not all require large
expenditures or technological wizardry.11 Many healthcare objectives can
be achieved at minimal financial cost.12 Yet, in some circumstances a
physician’s motivations can become unnecessarily conflicted by financial
incentives that complicate the relational dynamics and delicate balance
between the pecuniary interests of the physician, the health interests of the
patient, and the best interests of the broader society.13 One such
circumstance, discussed in this article, is the business of dialysis.
The healthcare delivery business is marked by at least these three
distinctive qualities: the centrality of a relationship predicated upon trust
between a professional healthcare provider and a patient; the unique
potential for vulnerability and compromised judgment on the part of a
8.
See Stephen A. Eraker & Peter Politser, How Decisions are Reached: Physician
and Patient, in PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A READER IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 380,
380–81 (1988).
9. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV. BUS. REV. 143, 145 (1968)
(“That most businessmen are not indifferent to ethics in their private lives, everyone will
agree. My point is that in their office lives they cease to be private citizens, they become
game players who must be guided by a somewhat different set of ethical standards.”). Of
course, there are competing views of how the business “game” should be played. See Per
Saxegaard, Being and Acting Business Worthy, in TIMOTHY L. FORT, THE VISION OF THE
FIRM 282, 286 (2014) (“If you try to conduct business without a set of rules and values, it’s
not business, it becomes “eat or be eaten. . . . We need to embrace ethical awareness and
responsible conduct.”); Mattia J. Gilmartin & R. Edward Freeman, Business Ethics and
Health Care: A Stakeholder Perspective 27 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 52 (2002) (arguing
that much of the criticism of the business of health care flows from a “cowboy capitalism”
conceptualization that frames business as a “competitive jungle resting on self-interest and
an urge for competition in order to survive” which stakeholder theory challenges).
10. See Laurie Mortara, A Reminder of Medicine’s Main Purpose, KEVINMD (Oct. 5,
2012), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2012/10/reminder-medicines-main-purpose.html.
11. See ALAN HAYCOX, WHAT IS HEALTH ECONOMICS? 1 (2d ed. 2009), available at
http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/painres/download/whatis/what_is_health_econ.pdf.
12. See id. at 2.
13. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 24 (1986) (noting that “[w]hen the first
physician requested a fee for his services, economics and conflict of interest entered
medicine.”).
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patient who views her physician first and foremost as an advocate for and
guardian of her best interests; and the myriad, integrated issues of cost,
quality, and access related to a finite supply of medical services and
providers—all against the backdrop of a fundamental good, i.e., public
health, necessary for the community to flourish.14 This trio of concerns
makes the business of medicine unique—or at least heightens concerns
raised by business ethicists—and triggers a particularly necessary and
important reflection upon these ethical considerations.
“Ethics in its broadest sense,” Larry Churchill observes, “concerns
how we live and the choices we make.”15 In the context of practical policy
deliberations, such ethical reflection facilitates review of the array of values
in play and the commitments of the various participants.16 Contemplation
of ethical concerns, ultimately, makes it possible to understand more fully
the operative principles underlying stakeholders’ positions, as well as their
implications and likely consequences if adopted.17 To the extent health
policy decisions involve the prioritization of competing goods and the
distribution of benefits and burdens, ethical deliberation is, therefore,
essential.18 Moreover, as noted above, the delivery of healthcare is, “at its
roots, a helping enterprise,”—a business permeated with the concept of
care—that has been historically characterized by individual and corporate
commitments to serving the best interests of others, not a reductionist
pursuit of profit maximization driven by advertising campaigns, efforts to
increase sales, and strategies for capturing market share.19 This article will
argue that as a business that operates with some fundamentally unique
variables, those in the healthcare business (particularly those engaged in the
delivery of dialysis care to patients) should take seriously the concept of
ethical astuteness (a concept that will be further described in Part V)—both
as a professional safeguard against the creep of competing economic
interests (driven by the demands of third party investors) that might
14. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the PhysicianPatient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995) (identifying six
core facets of the doctor-patient relationship: choice, competence, communication,
compassion, continuity, and the absence of conflicts of interest).
15. Larry R. Churchill, What Ethics Can Contribute to Health Policy, in ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH POLICY 53 (Marion Danis, Carolyn Clancy & Larry R. Churchill
eds., 2002).
16. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 53 (“The three principles that guide an ethics of
health policy [include] . . . patient commitment, institutional commitment, and provider
community orientation.”).
17. See Perry, supra note 2.
18. Brennan, supra note 4, at 72.
19. Brennan, supra note 4, at 38. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs.
Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 238
(1995) (discussing what ethical standards will govern competitively managed healthcare
organizations). But see Joshua E. Perry, An Obituary for Physician-Owned Specialty
Hospitals, 23 HEALTH LAWYER 24, 24–34 (2010) (describing the tensions between
commercialism and professionalism throughout the history of medical practice in the United
States).
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compromise the health care profession’s primary commitment to patient
care and as a pragmatic strategy in the inevitable need to defend the
healthcare provider against tort claims of medical malpractice.
II.
A.

FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY20
The Rise of For-Profit Medicine

Writing for the Institute of Medicine in 1983, Bradford Gray
outlined the controversy surrounding the widespread emergence of forprofit medicine during the 1970s.21 Proponents of the investor-owned trend
in health care heralded the efficiencies, innovations, and fiscal discipline
associated with business management practices designed to grow market
share and maximize profits consistent with free market principles.22 Critics,
however, argued that conflicts of interest are constitutive of for-profit
business models that are premised upon financial incentives designed to
encourage the ever-expanding consumption of finite and expensive goods.23
Such conflicts of interest have, for example, resulted in well-documented
cases of unnecessary medical services and treatments, often bloating
systemic health care costs at taxpayers’ expense.24
20. Much of what follows in this section was adapted from Joshua E. Perry & Robert
C. Stone, In the Business of Dying: Questioning the Commercialization of Hospice, 39 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 224–234 (2010).
21. BRADFORD H. GRAY ET AL., An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in
THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 2 (1983). In fact, observers of the practice of medicine
in America have been sounding alarms about the creeping commercialization of U.S. health
care for at least the last thirty years. See Arnold S. Relman, A Second Opinion 36 (2007). It
was 1980 when Arnold Relman, then editor of the New England Journal of Medicine,
described what he alarmingly viewed as the “new medical-industrial complex” of for-profit
corporations in the business of providing health care services to patients. Arnold S. Relman,
The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980) [hereinafter
Relman, The New Medical Industrial Complex]. Dr. Relman was particularly concerned
about the emergence of proprietary hospitals and nursing homes, as well as home care,
diagnostic laboratory, and hemodialysis services. Id.
22. M. M. Hasan, Let’s End the Nonprofit Charade, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1053,
1055 (1996).
23. Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can It Contribute to
Health Reform?, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 405, 428 (2010).
24. James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 209 (1996).
Professor Blumstein cites numerous studies confirming the overutilization that results from
perverse economic incentives. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., NO. OAI-12-88-01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS
AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES 18 (1989), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-1288-01410.pdf. (“Patients of referring physicians known to be owners or investors in clinical
laboratories received, on the average, 45 percent more clinical laboratory services than all
Medicare patients, in general, regardless of place.”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO.
GAO/HEHS-95-2, REFERRALS TO PHYSICIAN-OWNED IMAGING FACILITIES; Blumstein, supra
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In extreme cases, pressures to meet profit goals and satisfy investor
expectations have resulted in fraud prosecutions of for-profit health care
providers, most infamously realized in the cases of Tenet Healthcare and
Healthcare Corporation of America (“HCA”), although the nonprofit sector
has not been immune from government prosecution arising out of illicit
reimbursement practices.25 It is precisely because of congressional cost
concerns related to fraudulent billing and other improper over-utilization of
Medicare-reimbursable services that anti-kickback legislation, the Stark
laws, enforcement of the False Claims Act, and other regulatory efforts
have proliferated from the mid-1970s through the most recent health care
reforms of 2010.26
Additionally, the emergence over the last thirty years of for-profit
health providers has prompted concerns about whether ownership status has
any correlation to the quality of care provided.27 On this point, the case of
nursing homes is illustrative. Relatively consistent data indicate that
differences in care do exist between for-profit and nonprofit nursing home
providers “as measured by staffing ratios, quality-of-care and quality of life
(“Studies of the use of diagnostic imaging equipment done in 1990 and 1994 showed that
patients of physicians who had an ownership interest in such equipment utilized some
equipment 400% more than the patients of nonowning physicians.”). J. M. Mitchell and E.
Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization,
Profits, and Service Characteristics, 268 JAMA 2055, 2057 (1992) (finding physicians
having ownership interests in physical therapy clinics or radiation therapy centers similarly
recommended patient visits to such facilities fifty percent more than did other physicians.”).
Additionally, Marc Rodwin’s book, Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physicians’
Conflicts of Interest (1993) includes copious evidence of ways in which physician selfinterest results in Medicare abuse. For example, Rodwin cites a December 17, 1987,
personal letter from Jim Codo, a medical laboratory salesperson who claimed that “where a
high percent of Medicare recipients reside, there is a correspondingly high percent of
physicians invested in laboratory ownership arrangements. The government in allowing such
[practices] . . . might as well issue the physician owners their own money press. The
physician controls the demand for services, owns the supply of the services, and is
guaranteed payment for services by the government.” Id. at 97. Moreover, in his article
Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, Rodwin points to eighteen
published studies by academic researchers and government regulators between 1970 and
1992 as evidence “that physicians who make referrals to medical facilities that they either
own or have a financial interest in recommend more (or more expensive) medical tests and
procedures than do physicians without a financial interest.” 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405,
1406 (1989).
25. Kurt Eichenwald, HCA is Said to Reach Deal on Settlement of Fraud Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/business/hca-is-said-to-reachdeal-on-settlement-of-fraud-case.html (reporting on an agreement with the Justice
Department to pay more than $880 million to settle a long-running inquiry into accusations
of health care fraud). See also E. T. Wood, Feds Win $19.4M in Lawsuit over Renal Care
Group Medicare Practices,
NASHVILLE POST (Mar. 23, 2010), https://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2010/3/23/feds_win
_194m_in_lawsuit_over_renal_care_group_medicare_practices.
26. Perry, supra note 19.
27. COMM. FOR IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTER. IN HEALTH CARE, FOR PROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 3 (Bradford H. Gray, ed. 1986).
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deficiencies, advance care planning discussions, complaints per home, and,
in some cases, adverse health outcomes.”28 The conflicting interests inherent in the incentive structures of for-profit health care endeavors demand
careful scrutiny.
B. The Medical-Industrial Complex and Dialysis
Dialysis, in fact, presents a “particularly interesting example of
stimulation of private enterprise by public financing of health care.”29
When former New England Journal of Medicine editor Arnold Relman
wrote about the emerging “medical-industrial complex,” he was referring in
part to the rapid expansion of the patient population receiving long-term
hemodialysis following Congress’s decision in 1972 to cover treatment of
end-stage renal disease under Medicare.30 Fueled by the flow of federal
funds, the for-profit dialysis industry mushroomed from nearly non-existent
in the early 1970s to a 40% market share by 1980.31
By 2002, 75% of dialysis services were provided by private, forprofit facilities, and early fears about compromises in patient care were
being realized in the form of longer hospital stays (17% more days in
hospital) and increased risk for premature patient death among for-profit
providers.32 One of the most recent studies, published January 9, 2014,
reported that overall hospitalization rates were significantly higher (15%)
for patients receiving dialysis in for-profit compared with nonprofit dialysis
28. Melissa D. A. Carlson, William T. Gallo & Elizabeth H. Bradley, Ownership
Status and Patterns of Care in Hospice: Results from the National Home and Hospice Care
Survey, 42 MED. CARE 432 (2004) (citing W. E. Aaronson et al., Do For-Profit and Not-ForProfit Nursing Homes Behave Differently? 34 GERONTOLOGIST 775 (1994); C. Harrington et
al., Does Investor Ownership of Nursing Homes Compromise the Quality of Care?, 91 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1452 (2001); E. H. Bradley and C. W. Walker, Education and Advance Care
Planning in Nursing Homes: The Impact of Ownership Type, 27 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 339 (1998); B. A. Weisbrod and M. Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit
Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric Information: The Case of the Nursing Homes, in
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (S. Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); S. Y. Chou,
Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An Empirical Analysis of Nursing
Homes, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 293 (2002)). See generally Vikram R. Comondore et al.,
Quality of Care in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Nursing Homes: Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 339 BRIT. MED. J. 381 (2009).
29. Relman,The New Medical Industrial Complex, supra note 21, at 965.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. P. J. Devereaux et al., Comparison of Mortality Between Private For-Profit and
Private Not-For-Profit Hemodialysis Centers: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 288
JAMA 2449, 2450 (2002); L.A. Szczech et al., Associations Between CMS’s Clinical
Performance Measures Project Benchmarks, Profit Structure, and Mortality in Dialysis
Units, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 2094, 2097 (2006) (“[I]rrespective of its minor contribution, profit
status was associated with mortality.”); Donald K.K. Lee, et al., Reexploring Differences
Among For-Profit and Nonprofit Dialysis Providers, 45 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 633, 640
(2010); Y. Zhang et al., The Effect of Dialysis Chains on Mortality Among Patients
Receiving Hemodialysis, 46 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 747, 759 (2011).
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facilities.33 Furthermore, for-profit dialysis facilities had higher admission
rates for heart failure and volume overload (37% higher), as well as
vascular access complications (15% higher) compared with nonprofit
facilities.34 These findings echo data published fifteen years ago in the New
England Journal of Medicine that also documented an association between
for-profit ownership and a lower quality of care.35
Similarly, additional studies have shown greater utilization of
erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (i.e., Epogen, Epoetin, or EPO – the
primary drug used to treat anemia resulting from kidney disease) in forprofit versus nonprofit facilities.36 In fact, Medicare reimbursements for
Epogen—the second-largest source of dialysis facility income—were
discovered to be incentivizing large, for-profit chain facilities to administer
dosages of the drug in excess of the clinical guidelines, which resulted in a
January 1, 2011, change in Medicare payment structures.37
Finally, it should be noted that researchers have also found
decreased rates of listing for transplantation in for-profit facilities, as well
as decreased transplant education time with nephrologists at for-profit
compared with nonprofit dialysis facilities.38 Attempting to explain their
findings, these researchers pointed to a greater emphasis on income
generation and concomitant lack of incentives for unprofitable interventions
at for-profit dialysis facilities.39

33. Lorien S. Dalrymple et al., Comparison of Hospitalization Rates Among ForProfit and Nonprofit Dialysis Facilities, 9 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 73, 73
(2014).
34. Barry M. Straube, Do Health Outcomes Vary by Profit Status of Hemodialysis
Units?, 9 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1, 1 (2014).
35. Pushkal P. Garg et al., Effect of the Ownership of Dialysis Facilities on Patients’
Survival and Referral for Transplantation, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1653 (1999). J.M. Brooks
et al., Effect of Dialysis Center Profit-Status on Patient Survival: A Comparison of RiskAdjustment and Instrumental Variable Approaches, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 2267, 2286
(2006) (finding that “the competitive market for dialysis services forced all dialysis
providers to maintain sufficient quality levels regardless of the overriding goals of each
organization.”).
36. In July 2012, DaVita agreed to pay $55 million to the federal government to settle
allegations related to its use of Epogen in dialysis patients. See Michael Booth and
Christopher N. Osher, Denver-Based DaVita Settles Case on Overuse of Kidney Care Drug,
THE DENVER POST (July 4, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21002816/denver-baseddavita-settles-case-overuse-kidney-care (“The Texas whistleblower lawsuit accused DaVita
of using more Epogen than was medically necessary, and for double-billing the government
for Epogen left over in vials and reused.”). See generally M. Thamer et al., Dialysis Facility
Ownership and Epoetin Dosing in Patients Receiving Hemodialysis, 297 JAMA 1667
(2007).
37. Thomas A. Golper et al., Home Dialysis in the New USA Bundled Payment Plan:
Implications and Impact, 31 PERITONEAL DIALYSIS INT’L 12 (2011).
38. Garg, supra note 35; K.S. Balhara, et al., Disparities in Provision of Transplant
Education by Profit Status of the Dialysis Center, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 3104 (2012).
39. See Garg, supra note 35, at 1660; Balhara, supra note 38, at 3110.
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THE DAVITA CASE STUDY40

With revenue in excess of $8 billion41 and more than 50,000
employees,42 DaVita HealthCare Partners, Inc. is one of the United States’
leading providers of kidney care, i.e., dialysis services, and related lab
services.43 According to filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, DaVita provides dialysis and administrative services in the
United States through a network of 2,074 outpatient dialysis centers in
forty-five states and the District of Columbia, serving a total of
approximately 163,000 patients.44 DaVita also provides acute inpatient
dialysis services in approximately 1,000 hospitals and related laboratory
services throughout the United States.45
A.

Case of William Pepper
On the morning of January 8, 2009, William Pepper began
outpatient dialysis treatment at Yakima Dialysis Center
(hereinafter, “DaVita”), a medical facility owned and
operated by [DaVita, Inc. and Renal Treatment Centers
West, Inc]. At the time of his treatment, Mr. Pepper

40. A review of research of litigation involving DaVita revealed the following cases:
Miles v. DaVita RX, LLC, 962 F.Supp.2d 825 (D. Md. 2013) (involving a Title VII hostile
work environment claim); IHS Dialysis, Inc. v. DaVita, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2468(ER), 2013
WL 1309737 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2013) (involving an antitrust action); United States v.
DaVita, Inc. and Gambro Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:07–CV–2509–CAP, 2013 WL 1342431
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2013) (involving a contract dispute and False Claims Act claim);
Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2012) (involving a worker’s compensation
claim); Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., No. 10–602–GPM, 2011 WL 2532845 (S.D. Ill. June 24, 2011)
(involving a retaliatory discharge claim); Moran v. DaVita, Inc., No. 06-5620(JAP), 2009
WL 792074 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2009) (involving an employment dispute); Total Renal Care,
Inc. v. W. Nephrology and Metabolic Bone Disease, P.C., No. 08–cv–00513–CMA–KMT,
2009 WL 2596493 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2009) (involving an antitrust action); Mason v.
DaVita, Inc., 542 F. Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving an employment dispute);
Hardiman v. DaVita, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-262-JM, 2007 WL 1395568 (N.D. Ind. May 10,
2007) (involving a negligence action); Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 480 F.3d 950 (9th
Cir., 2007) (involving a FMLA employment dispute); DaVita, Inc. v. Washington State
Dep’t of Health, 151 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (involving a dispute regarding
Certificate of Need decision); Martinez v. DaVita, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(involving a covenant not to compete dispute).
41. Senior Analyst—Revenue Operations, Team Revelation: Position Description,
DAVITA, http://careers.davita.com/search/208802/37027/senior-analyst-revenue-operationsteam-revelation (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
42. Our Careers, DAVITA, http://careers.davita.com/careers (last visited Mar. 24,
2015).
43. DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 2 (2014),
available at http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=98023871121-936138&type=sect&TabIndex=2&dcn=0001193125-14-062565&nav=1&src=Yahoo.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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exhibited signs of poor health: he was receiving controlled
delivery of oxygen, and required significant assistance to
move himself into the dialysis chair to receive treatment.
Some DaVita staff members expressed concern that Mr.
Pepper was receiving outpatient—as opposed to
inpatient—dialysis treatment, given his poor condition.
Customarily, dialysis patients who are more fragile or ill
require a higher level of supervision than healthier patients,
and thus receive inpatient treatment. 46
At approximately 1:55 p.m. that afternoon—several hours
into Mr. Pepper’s dialysis treatment—DaVita’s medical
staff discovered that Mr. Pepper was unconscious and not
breathing. A large amount of Mr. Pepper’s blood had
pooled on the floor beneath his dialysis chair, and blood
also covered the chair itself and Mr. Pepper’s clothes.
Upon discovering his condition, DaVita staff began treating
Mr. Pepper.
Although Mr. Pepper briefly regained
consciousness, he was subsequently transported to
Memorial Hospital, where he died at 9:20 p.m. that
evening.47
At the time Mr. Pepper exsanguinated, [i.e., experienced
his extreme blood loss], many DaVita staff members were
participating in a “mock audit” in preparation for an actual
upcoming audit by the Washington State Department of
Health (“DOH”). During this mock audit, only two patient
care technicians (“PCTs”) were assigned to the treatment
“pod” in which Mr. Pepper and six other dialysis patients
were receiving treatment. One of the PCTs, Mauro
Hernandez, was on break and not in the treatment area at
the time Mr. Pepper exsanguinated. The other PCT,
Bonnie Hursh, was connecting another patient to a dialysis
machine at the time of the incident. . . . Plaintiff’s
[proffered] expert, Tricia West, R.N. [testified during her
deposition] that Mr. Pepper’s substantial blood loss was, by
itself, evidence of a problem with the visibility of Mr.
Pepper’s dialysis access. [Nurse West further testified,] “I
believe that [had Mr. Pepper’s] access been visible and

46. Sutton v. Renal Treatment Centers W., Inc., No. CV–10–3067–EFS, 2013 WL
550241 (E.D. Wash. Feb 12, 2013).
47. Id.
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[had DaVita’s staff] observed the dislodged needle, they
would have intervened and stopped the blood loss.”48
....
In response to Mr. Pepper’s death, DOH began
investigating DaVita’s patient safety practices. Several
weeks following Mr. Pepper’s death, DOH investigators
visited the DaVita facility and found that the dialysis
accesses of four separate patients were not visible to
facility staff at all times during treatment [as required by
federal regulations]. DOH also interviewed the facility’s
administrator, Shomei Meister, and determined that she did
not know the proper definition of “visible at all times” with
regard to a patient’s access. DOH concluded that DaVita’s
policies and procedures did not properly define—and that
facility staff did not have a clear understanding of what
constituted—a “visible dialysis access.”49
B.

Case of Deborah Scott
[Deborah Scott], a social worker, was an “at will”
employee at DaVita’s North Oakland Dialysis Facility
(“DaVita Facility”) in Pontiac, Michigan, from 1996 to
February 5, 2004. . . . In or around November 2003, [Ms.
Scott called] a toll-free phone number that was posted at
the DaVita Facility [to complain] about “staffing
irregularities,” such as inadequate and inaccurate reporting
of staffing and high staff turnover that she felt adversely
impacted patient safety. [Additionally, Scott] complained
about “charting irregularities” such as long-term care plans
were not done as often as required. [Later, during audits
from state regulators, Ms. Scott] made similar complaints
about “short staffing, charting issues, turnover in staff,” the
hiring of inexperienced replacements for technicians,
“scheduling irregularities,” and patients’ fear about their
safety. 50

48. Id. at *1. “Defendants argued that Nurse West’s opinion about these two potential
causes for Mr. Pepper’s exsanguination constituted impermissible speculation,” but the court
disagreed and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3.
49. Id. at *2.
50. Scott v. Total Renal Care, Inc., No. 04-71700, 2005 WL 1680677, *1 (E.D. Mich.
July 19, 2005).
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Either as a result of Ms. Scott’s complaints or patients’ complaints,
state regulators made an unannounced visit to the DaVita Facility on
January 16-18, 2004 and issued citations for lack of documentation
regarding long-term care and insufficient staffing.51 Ms. Scott was
terminated on February 5, 2004 and later filed a claim for retaliatory
termination on May 5, 2004.52 Finding that Ms. Scott was unable to show
that she was discharged because of her protected activity, her claims were
dismissed by the court.53
C.

Case of Demitria Howard
Beginning in late 2007, DaVita employed Demitria
Howard as a dialysis technician.54 Although Howard
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, she sued
DaVita alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
on the basis that DaVita did not credit her any time beyond
40 hours, nor did DaVita fully compensate her.55
In March 2010, Howard sent an email to the DaVita’s
regional operations director, Matthew Forsythe, to inform
him that she had not been fully compensated for the hours
she worked. In May 2010, Forsythe met with Howard to
discuss the back pay owed to her. Forsythe offered back
pay, but Howard alleges that DaVita owed her significantly
more than Forsythe offered. Also, Howard allege[d] that
DaVita did not compensate other dialysis technicians for
overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate. Last,
Howard allege[d] that it was DaVita’s policy and practice
to falsely deduct hours from its employees[‘] time cards to
bring their total hours below 40 per week to avoid paying
overtime.56

The trial court denied DaVita’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), finding Howard’s claims plausible on their face because
she had alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
subsequent discovery would reveal evidence supporting her allegations.57

51. Id. at *3.
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id. at *11.
54. Howard v. Renal Life Link, Inc., No. 10 C 3225, 2010 WL 4483323, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 1, 2010).
55. Id.
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *3.
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Accusations of Medicare Fraud and Stark Kickback Violations

In July 2012, DaVita agreed to pay $55 million to the federal
government to settle allegations raised by whistleblowers in Texas related
to its use of Epogen (a drug used to treat anemia) in dialysis patients.58
Overuse of Epogen can lead to heart problems, blood clots, and even
premature deaths.59 As of 2007, prior to new Medicare reimbursement
policies that now limit use of Epogen, 25% of DaVita’s revenue and up to
40% of its earnings were connected to the drug, according to the Stanford
Group Company research firm.60
Filed in 2007 (but only unsealed in 2010), whistle-blower litigation
is currently pending in Georgia federal court alleging $800 million in
Medicare fraud from 2003 through 2010 related to administration and
wastage of the drugs Zemplar and Venofer.61 The lawsuit alleges that
DaVita required nurses to use one ten-microgram vial of Zemplar, a vitamin
D drug, instead of a six-microgram does in three two-microgram vials.62
DaVita then billed Medicare for all ten micrograms even though four were
not used.63 Instead of giving an entire 100-milligram vial of Venofer, an
iron drug, once or twice a month, the clinics gave twenty-five-milligram
doses more frequently, according to the lawsuit.64 But since the drug came
only in a 100-milligram vial, Medicare was billed for 100 milligrams for
each dose, even though seventy-five milligrams were wasted, the lawsuit
says.65
While DaVita denies all wrongdoing in these Medicare fraud qui
tam actions – even in the case of its $55 million settlement regarding
Epogen abuse – 2008 figures from a government-funded program that
tracks dialysis in the United States reveal that DaVita spent more per
patient on iron drugs, Vitamin D drugs, and Epogen than any other chain
dialysis provider.66
In February 2014, DaVita announced it would pay $389 million to
settle criminal and civil anti-kickback charges stemming from a multi-year
58. Booth & Osher, supra note 36.
59. Andrew Pollack, The Dialysis Business: Fair Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2007, at B1.
60. Id.
61. United States ex rel. Vainer v. DaVita, Inc. and Gambro Healthcare, Inc., No.
1:07-CV-2509-CAP, 2013 WL 1342431, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2013) (denying
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment). See also Bill Rankin, Whistle-Blowers
Say Dialysis Firm Bilked Medicare, ATL. J. CONST. (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/differing-views-in-massive-whistle-blowercase/nTPwY/; Andrew Pollack, Lawsuit Says Drugs Were Wasted to Buoy Profit, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2011, at B1.
62. United States ex rel. Vainer, 2013 WL 1342431, at *8.
63. Id. at *2.
64. See Pollack supra note 59.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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investigation by the U. S. Attorney’s Office in Denver, the civil division of
the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services’ Office of Inspector General into whether DaVita’s joint
ventures with kidney doctors complied with the Stark laws governing
financial relationships that might influence where patients seek medical
treatment.67
E.

Kent Thiry, DaVita CEO: Success and “Cult of Personality”68

When Kent Thiry was recruited to run Total Renal Care in 1999, its
revenue was $1.4 billion and its stock traded around $2.69 Thiry changed
the company’s name to DaVita and overhauled the corporate culture.70
Often referred to as the “Mayor” of the “DaVita Village,” Thiry is known
to wear a musketeer outfit and enthusiastically (and dramatically) cheerlead
at corporate training events with an “All for One, and One for All” chant
and over-the-top presentation antics.71 By 2006, Thiry had taken the
company to $4.9 billion in revenues and a $62 stock price.72 As of 2012,
revenues had soared to $8.1 billion and stock was selling near $100.73
Headquartered in Denver, DaVita owns approximately 2,100 outpatient
dialysis centers (second in market share behind German-owned Fresenius)
in forty-five states and the District of Columbia, serves 163,000 patients
and employees over 53,000 people.74
DaVita has been lauded as the subject of a Stanford Business
School case study,75 recognized by CNN Money as #2 on its rankings of the
“World’s Most Admired Companies” in healthcare, and – for four
consecutive years – ranked number one in innovation on Fortune
Magazine’s “World’s Most Admired Companies” ranking of health care
facilities.76 Moreover, DaVita’s compliance and ethics training program,
which recently received the “Health Ethics Trust’s Best Practices” Award,

67. See Christopher N. Osher, DaVita to Pay $389 Million to Settle Anti-Kickback
Investigation, THE DENV. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_26780
485/davita-pay-389-million-settle-anti-kickback-investigations.
68. Luc Hatlestad, The Strangest Show on Earth, 5280 MAGAZINE, Sept. 2012,
available at http://www.5280.com/magazine/2012/09/strangest-show-earth.
69. Pollack, supra note 59.
70. Hatlestad, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Pollack, supra note 59.
73. Hatlestaad, supra note 68.
74. Id.
75. Jeffrey Pfeffer, KENT THIRY AND DAVITA: LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN BUILDING
AND GROWING A GREAT COMPANY, Case OB-54, STAN. GRAD. SCHOOL OF BUS., (2006).
76. DAVITA HEALTH CARE PARTNERS, AWARDS AND RECOGNITION, DAVITA,
http://www.davita.com/UploadedFiles/About_v4/Media_Room/Awards_and_Recognition.p
df (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
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has been in place since at least 2005.77 It is composed of fifty full-time
employees and is led by Jeanine Jiganti, chief compliance officer.78
DaVita’s approach to compliance and ethics training combines in-person
training sessions, automated online training, and ongoing real-time
guidance and support from the company’s compliance team.79 According
to a report in the journal Ethikos, DaVita employees are administered
compliance training upon hire, and required to complete at least one
compliance training course per year (more, depending on the position and
role within the company), with the majority of these trainings occurring via
an online educational experience.80 Sarah Richardson, a senior director in
the compliance department notes that the focus of trainings for “officebased teammates” is on “the False Claims Act, kickback policies, and how
to interpret federal regulations,” while patient care is the top concern among
those DaVita employees located in clinical settings.81
The compliance and ethics training program notwithstanding, as
documented above, a review of legal filings and media reports raises a
variety of cases that, in the aggregate, reveal a healthcare firm with
financial interests potentially in conflict with the ultimate professional
mandate of any health care provider, namely, delivering quality health care
in a manner and means that protects the best interest of the patient.
Furthermore, as a matter of business strategy, a more robust recognition of
the competing interests introduced by a for-profit business model might
mitigate exposure to legal liabilities arising out of malpractice claims.
IV.

LEGAL ASTUTENESS AS A TEMPLATE FOR ETHICAL
ASTUTENESS

In 2008, Professor Constance Bagley published a ground-breaking
paper in the prestigious Academy of Management Review wherein she
argued that “failure to integrate law into the development of strategy and of
action plans can place a firm at a competitive disadvantage.”82 Bagley
labeled her concept “legal astuteness” and described it further as “the
ability of a [top management team] to communicate effectively with
counsel and to work together to solve complex problems” by developing
“(1) a set of value-laden attitudes,” (2) a proactive approach, (3) the ability
to exercise informed judgment, and (4) context-specific knowledge of the
relevant law and appropriate application of legal tools.”83 The value of
77. Alexandra Theodore, When It Comes to Compliance Training, DaVita Seeks to
Add ‘Adventure,’ 27 ETHIKOS 1, 1–2 (Nov–Dec. 2013).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id.
82. Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 378, 378–79 (2008).
83. Id. at 379.
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“legal astuteness” to an organization might be realized as better internal
management or competitive advantage in the market through increased
value along one or more of these strategically important domains.84 After
elaborating briefly on Bagley’s work, Part V argues that in the context of
healthcare businesses, such as the business of dialysis, a failure to integrate
ethical astuteness into the firm’s culture can similarly create market
disadvantages and potential legal exposure.
A.

The Attitudinal Component of Legal Astuteness

For business managers, the law, as well as related regulations, sets
forth the boundaries of what is and what is not permissible.85 In a
normative sense, the law also functions as a reflection of society’s values
and attitudes regarding right conduct, and savvy is the organizational
manager who respects not only the letter, but also the spirit of laws relevant
to her industry.86 As Bagley notes, “legally astute management teams
understand the importance of anticipating tomorrow’s laws and of trying to
predict how existing laws may be interpreted, enforced, and changed in the
future.”87 How a firm responds to the grey areas surrounding bright line
legal rules can impact the firm’s public reputation for good or ill.88
B.

The Proactive Component of Legal Astuteness

As Mary Daly observes, business managers desire legal counsel
that addresses business opportunities and threats in ways that are effective,
efficient, and strategic.89 Contrary to how some business professionals
view the law, those bringing “legal astuteness” to business decision-making
need not be merely restrictive and concerned with policing business
conduct.90
Rather, forward-thinking, creative and legally astute
management teams can add significant value in the execution of business
strategy, as well as the development of legal safeguards.

84. Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2010). See also Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal
Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12–38 (2008) (identifying five behaviors that
managers can use to gain competitive advantage).
85. See Bagley, supra note 84, at 588–89.
86. See id.
87. Bagley, supra note 82, at 380.
88. See Bagley, supra note 84, at 589.
89. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a
Global Organization: The Role of General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1061 (1997).
90. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
463 (2000).
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The Judgment Component of Legal Astuteness

Bagley’s discussion of judgment recognizes that much ambiguity
and uncertainty often infuse both legal analysis and business strategy and
thus, it is crucial that managers cultivate deliberative wisdom.91 An
appreciation for the law can help in this regard, as precedent can guide
analogical reasoning and professional norms, such as prudence can promote
caution. Moreover, legal astuteness, at least on Bagley’s account, also
includes a recognition of the cognitive biases and pressures that can
compromise good decision making.92
D.

The Knowledge Component of Legal Astuteness

The fourth component of “legal astuteness” refers to the specific
and substantive advantage that legal literacy and functional familiarity with
“the role that law plays in setting the rules of the game.”93 Bagley argues
that business managers with the ability to “harness the creative power of
legal language are more adept at seeing and shaping the legal structure of
the world.”94 Specifically, she identifies “legal astuteness” as: 1) an ability
to use legal tools, such as contracts in ways that strengthen relationships
and create options while reducing transaction costs; and 2) an ability to
convert regulatory constraints into opportunities and creative advantages.95
V.

ETHICAL ASTUTENESS

Drawing upon the concept of legal astuteness as developed by
Bagley, I define ethical astuteness as a substantive and strategic focus by a
firm’s management team on its ethical responsibilities to patients and public
health.
The view of ethical astuteness that I am introducing and outlining
in this paper aims to add value for a firm in the healthcare business – with a
particular application to a for-profit organization providing dialysis services
– by addressing two chief concerns: A.) The competing priorities between
the patient’s interest in the healthcare encounter and the investor’s interest
in generating a return on profits; and B.) The vulnerabilities of a
financially-conflicted, for-profit healthcare provider to an allegation of
medical malpractice.

91. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 132 (1995).
92. Bagley, supra note 82, at 382.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 383.
95. Id. at 386–87.

2015]
A.

FOR PATIENTS AND PROFITS

55

Professional Priorities and Safeguards

As Leonard Weber has observed, healthcare management ethics is
business ethics, “but business ethics with a difference.”96 Weber frames his
discussion of healthcare business ethics in terms of the healthcare
organization’s responsibility to community service.97 He writes that
community-based ethics “requires of for-profits that they be managed with
a strong sense of social responsibility, such that they are fully and
realistically committed to serving the community at the same time that they
are committed to being profitable.”98 This sense of social responsibility
extends to a commitment to high-quality services and a commitment to
respecting patient rights. As discussed earlier, this respect for patient rights
flows from a respect for the person and the patient’s right to autonomy.
A robust culture of ethical astuteness can help remind and guide
management personnel charged with the daily operation of a dialysis clinic
that their business decisions must reflect these complex competing interests
of patients and communities. In the business of healthcare, justification of a
decision solely on the basis of profit or return on investment – without
recognition of additional stakeholders and reconciliation with the priorities
of medical ethics and professional standards among healthcare providers –
is unsustainable as a matter of business practice. As argued previously, the
business of healthcare is unique and must be practiced differently than other
business enterprises.
Moreover, another manifestation of ethical astuteness among
healthcare managers and business of medicine practitioners can result in
greater awareness of the “heuristics and biases” literature.99 Indeed
findings from this literature and the field of behavioral ethics suggest that
errors in framing, for example, contribute to erroneous ethical decisionmaking.100 For instance, ethical astuteness would mandate that a manager
of a dialysis clinic frame his business priorities each and every day in terms
of patient care, vis-à-vis staffing decisions, training, and maintenance of
equipment, just as much – if not more than – the attention paid to matters of
96. LEONARD J. WEBER, BUSINESS ETHICS IN HEALTHCARE: BEYOND COMPLIANCE 5
(2001).
97. Id. at 6.
98. Id. at 6–7.
99. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). As Professor Robert Prentice notes, this article
is “one of the most-cited in the history of the social sciences and its ideas have been usefully
applied in, among other fields, ‘medical diagnosis, legal judgment, intelligence analysis,
philosophy, finance, statistics, and military strategy.’” Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral
Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 4, 6 (forthcoming 2015) (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST
AND SLOW 8 (2011)).
100. RONALD A. HOWARD & CLINTON D. KORVER, ETHICS FOR THE REAL WORLD:
CREATING A PERSONAL CODE TO DECISIONS IN WORK AND LIFE 95 (2008) (“[O]ur biggest
mistakes in ethical decision making are mistakes in framing.”).
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As Professor Prentice

Moral awareness is a precondition to moral action. 101 It
should be the moral responsibility of every individual, to
keep ethical considerations in his or her own frame of
reference whenever making decisions. And it is the
responsibility of firms that wish their employees to act
legally and ethically to continually prompt them to do so.
The behavioral ethics literature indicates that this can have
a meaningful impact.102
B.

Pragmatic and Authentic Strategy

As a matter of practical, prophylactic business strategy, a
healthcare delivery firm, such as a dialysis clinic, could be well-served to
create a culture of ethical astuteness that intentionally “promote[s] an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law,” and thereby formalize protections from liability
that might flow from negligent patient care or disgruntled employees.103
Professor David Hess has documented the role that codes of conduct and
compliance programs, particularly when mandated by legislation like the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
can play in “proactively managing the ethical environment of their
firms.”104 Hess argues that management seeking to heighten ethical
awareness must be careful not either to focus exclusively on employee
monitoring and control or to adopt regulatory, ethical compliance programs
simply as a form of “insurance” in the case of litigation.105 In the context of
dialysis and other health care settings, management must personally
demonstrate a commitment to patient-first ethics and incorporate this
commitment to patient care into strategic business decisions and cultivation
of the organization’s culture.

101. Celia Moore & Francisco Gino, Ethically Adrift: How Others Pull Our Moral
Compass from True North, and How We Can Fix It, 33 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 53, 61 (2013)
(“Individuals are better equipped to make moral decisions if they are aware of the relevant
moral values and implications of the decisions they are facing.”).
102. Prentice, supra note 99, at 16.
103. David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2007) (citing to the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a)(2)). According to the Guidelines,
organizations that proactively manage legal compliance face significantly less harsh
penalties if they are caught engaging in some form of punishable conduct. Id.
104. Hess, supra note 103.
105. Id. at 1805 (“With limited time and resources to devote to their compliance
programs, it is reasonable to expect such managers to focus more of their efforts on internal
controls and less on developing an integrity-based program.”).
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Hess advocates for an approach to organizational ethical awareness
that builds integrity through an emphasis on organizational values and
employee self-governance, similar to what Professor Lynn Sharp Paine and
others began describing twenty years ago.106 With an authentic, integritybased ethics program, the focus is on creating an organizational culture
where employees are encouraged to discuss ethical issues and rewarded for
making responsible choices. Equipping and empowering employees to
make decisions – in the context of dialysis – that are in the best interest of
the patient should be among management’s top priorities. Ultimately, it
will be a sense of ownership among the employees that will characterize the
ethical awareness that flows from an organization’s strategic and authentic
integrity-based approach to ethics.
An illustration that demonstrates the distinctive behavior of
employee “ownership” can be found in the context of a vacation rental car.
When one rents a car on vacation, changing the oil never crosses the
renter’s mind. A car renter is merely using the car for a short time, without
any sense of personal investment in the long-term condition of the car.
Contrast this behavior with one who purchases a car. The reality of
ownership is that one must invest in the long-term care of the car, including
regular oil changes, so as to preserve the condition and long-term benefits
of the car. Similarly, fostering a sense of employee ownership is a critical
component to creating a climate of ethical astuteness that not only might
mitigate liability in a litigation context, but also should help promote a
more genuine commitment to patient care by all members of the health care
organization’s staff. In other words, emphasizing ethical astuteness should
cause an organization to shift from a focus on mere compliance to a focus
on authentic employee buy-in vis-à-vis prioritizing patient care. The
potential defense shield in the event of litigation, however, is a strategic and
potentially valuable corollary benefit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As noted above, mistakes are made in the delivery of healthcare
services, and medical malpractice actions frequently follow. Imagine a
hypothetical situation involving a dialysis clinic patient whose needle
becomes dislodged, resulting in the patient’s death, and subsequent tort
action for malpractice and wrongful death. If the plaintiff’s counsel can
establish that the death occurred as a result of the clinic’s failures to
106. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV. 106,
110–11 (1994). See also Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, Compliance and Values
Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 315 (1999); Gary R. Weaver, Linda Klebe Trevino & Philip L. Cochran, Corporate
Ethics Programs as Control Systems: Influences of Executive Commitment and
Environmental Factors, 42 ACAD. OF MGMT. 41 (1999); Linda Klebe Trevino & Gary
R.Weaver, Organizational Justice and Ethics Program “Follow-Through”: Influences on
Employees’ Harmful and Helpful Behavior, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 651 (2001).
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adequately secure the needle and/or failures to adequately monitor the
patient to ensure that the access site remained visible throughout the
duration of dialysis treatment, the plaintiff’s lawyer will surely further
connect the dots by arguing that either or both were more likely to occur
because financial pressures to deliver profits were in conflict with the
dialysis clinic’s primary duty to do what is in the best interest of the patient.
As the literature and lawsuits noted throughout this Article
demonstrate, in addition to the behavioral ethics literature documenting
why good people/organizations often fail to make good choices/policies,107
the tensions between financial best interests and patients’ best interests are
not always resolved by for-profit health care facilities and for-profit
providers in ways that promote or safeguard patient well-being.
In the absence of evidence documenting a culture of ethical
astuteness, it will be difficult for the dialysis clinic to rebut the presumption
that divided loyalties introduced by for-profit firm structures is particularly
dangerous for dialysis patients who are in a vulnerable position –
physically, emotionally and psychosocially. In front of a jury, dialysis
patients who rely on the nurses and techs and other employees at the
dialysis facility to put the patients’ best interest first and foremost, will be
sympathetic plaintiffs indeed. One need not be an avid viewer of
courtroom television dramas to imagine the plaintiff counsel’s closing
argument:
And so, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is for you to
decide—in the absence of any culture of ethical awareness
or astuteness—whether it is more likely than not that if the
nurses and techs and other dialysis clinic employees had
put the patient’s well-being first on that fateful morning,
his needle would not have become dislodged and remain
dislodged resulting in the catastrophic exsanguination that
resulted in his death. Surely, you must reach the
conclusion that the dialysis clinic’s failure to keep the
patient’s best medical interest and personal wellbeing as
the business’s primary interest can be best explained as an
unintended consequence of a culture that – regardless of
whatever corporate slogans and values are espoused by the
corporation’s charismatic leader – was ultimately
compromised by the subtle, yet powerful, incentives and
influences created by this publicly traded health care
corporation’s conflicting financial interests.

107. See e.g. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL
TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011); PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL.,
OBSTACLES TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING (2013); BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING
AN EMERGING FIELD (David DeCremer & Ann E Tenbrunsel eds., 2012).

